We were investigating a company in a Central American country that was counterfeiting our client’s products. We had located the counterfeiters’ warehouse and discovered they also operated a small store in the building. As a standard tactic, we decided to make a test purchase and sent two of our investigators – one to make the purchase and the other to surveil activities from outside.
When our operative attempted to make the purchase, however, the counterfeiters immediately became suspicious, asking how we knew about them because they did not advertise and used their store only for long- time clients. Thinking quickly, our investigator said he was referred to them by X store, which we had learned through our investigation was associated with the ware- house. The counterfeiters didn’t buy the explanation; they called the other store, and when their associates could not verify our man’s story, three armed and heavily tattooed men surrounded him while others closed and locked the warehouse door.
When our operative outside saw the door close, he attempted to text and then call our man inside the ware- house. Receiving no response, he then dialed the local police, but before he could report the incident he was sur- rounded by another group of armed, tattooed individuals and forced into the warehouse.
The counterfeiters strip-searched and interrogated our operatives. They confiscated their cell phones and wallets and photographed their contents, making note of the res- idential addresses of both investigators, which appeared on their national identity documents. They asked whether the men had family living at those addresses – an obvious threat.
The investigators stuck to their stories, insisting they had been referred to the warehouse by one of the clerks at the other store, and that they were only trying to buy products. After approximately 45 minutes, the local police arrived, and after conferring with the counterfeiters they took custody of our investigators. It was clear by their interaction, however, that the police were in cahoots with the counterfeiters.
The police brought the investigators to their car where they proceeded to interrogate them yet again. The police also repeated the search of their wallets, again copying down their document numbers and addresses as well as emptying the wallets of money. After another 15 minutes, they released our investigators with a stern warning not to return to the neighborhood and a reminder that the police now knew where the investigators lived.
What had begun as a simple test purchase led to our investigators being held captive for over an hour by what appeared to be gang members and the police – ending with implied threats to the investigators and their families. It was a clear lesson about the danger that can exist in even the most mundane investigation.
As a side note, we waited nine months for things to die down before coordinating a raid on the warehouse by members of the gang task force and tax authorities. The perpetrators were never charged for their IP violations, but the products were seized for failure to pay taxes.
Threats of violence constitute a solid reason why many companies choose outside investigators instead of employees to conduct IP investigations. Imagine if those two detained investigators had been employed by our client. Any identification in their wallet tying them to their employer would have alerted the counterfeiters of the real reason they had attempted to make the test purchase. That discovery would have placed them in further danger.